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365 
THE CFPB’S ENDAROUND 
Chris O’Brien+ 
Michael Marcus has been considering buying a used vehicle for several 
months.1  He gives the salesman his name, address, and social security number; 
however, without Michael’s knowledge, the salesman changes the information 
on his credit application.2  Michael’s information is sent to a creditor who, 
without verifying any of the information on the credit application, immediately 
“approves” the application at a rate of 14.9%.3  After a few months, Michael 
realizes that his interest rate is extremely high and that he is unable to qualify 
for a credit card.4  As it turns out, the salesman’s falsification of Michael’s credit 
history not only increased his interest rate for the car but also destroyed his credit 
rating.5  Now, Michael is stuck with a car that he can’t afford and his credit has 
been destroyed.6  The abusive practices seen in Michael’s case, such as charging 
disproportionately higher interest rates to certain borrowers and overextending 
credit, have recently come under scrutiny because they mirror the activities that 
contributed to the mortgage crisis in 2008.7 
For many consumers, the design of most cities and the lack of reliable public 
transportation make a vehicle a necessity.8  When consumers have poor credit, 
purchasing a vehicle can be a cumbersome task because lenders use 
creditworthiness as a measure of the likelihood a loan will be repaid.9  The task 
is especially cumbersome for subprime borrowers: “individual[s] with a less-
                                                 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., The University 
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 1. This example is based loosely on Marcus v. Plaza Auto Mall, Ltd.  See Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant at *3, Marcus v. Plaza Auto Mall, Ltd., No. 200-307186, 2004 WL 3719320 (N.Y.A.D. 
Apr. 16, 2004). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. at *2–3. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See David Heath, Buyer Beware: Car Dealers Adopt Outlawed Mortgage Tactics, New 
Consumer Agency Powerless Against Them, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/04/11/4070/buyer-beware. 
 8. CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, 
PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO FINANCE AND OTHER NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT 447 (1st ed. 2012). 
 9. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, A-RCR, RATING CREDIT RISK: 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (2001), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/co 
mptrollers-handbook/rating-credit-risk/pub-ch-rating-credit-risk.pdf. 
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than-perfect credit rating.”10  When a consumer has a subprime credit rating, 
fewer lenders are willing to extend credit to that consumer.11  Consequently, it 
is difficult for subprime borrowers to obtain loans, and when they do, the loans 
come with significantly higher interest rates to compensate the lender for the 
increased risk.12 
Following the housing bubble and subsequent economic crisis of 2008, 
subprime lending came under close scrutiny.13  Although many believed that the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank)14 would protect against future meltdowns, concern is growing 
about a potential bubble in auto loan market.15  The heart of this concern is that 
automobile lenders are over-extending credit to subprime borrowers—behavior 
eerily reminiscent of pre-2008 mortgage lending—which could make the 
automotive industry ripe for a repeat of 2008.16 
                                                 
 10. Glossary: Subprime Borrower, LENDINGTREE , https://www.lendingtree.com/glossary/ 
what-is-subprime-borrower (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).  Subprime borrowers typically have any 
number of the following characteristics: a FICO score below 660, recent delinquencies, a 
foreclosure in the last two years, a recent bankruptcy, a poor debt-to-income ratio, and trouble 
paying living expenses.  Id. 
 11. See id. (“A subprime borrower is someone whose credit history has blemishes on 
it.  Because of this, a subprime borrower may find getting a mortgage to be a bit difficult, but it is 
still possible. However, subprime borrowers are often subject to higher interest rates.”). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Chris Matthews, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Wasn’t About Subprime Mortgages, 
FORTUNE (June 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/17/subprime-mortgage-recession/ (“In the 
years following the financial crisis . . . journalists zeroed in on one set of villains: subprime lenders 
and the supposedly irresponsible borrowers who were their customers. We were regaled with stories 
of mortgage lenders like Countrywide handing out loans that borrowers couldn’t possibly repay, 
and then selling them on to investment banks, who packaged them into ‘toxic’ bundles like 
Goldman Sachs’ infamous Abacus collateralized debt obligation.”). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C). 
 15. See, e.g., Matt Egan, U.S. Government Worried About Risky Car Loans, CNN (July 11, 
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/11/investing/auto-loans-risk-occ/. 
 16. See Allan Smith, The U.S. Auto Loan Debt Market is Reminiscent of the Subprime 
Mortgage Bubble, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allan-
smith/the-us-auto-loan-debt-mar_b_11911206.html; Michael Snyder, The One Trillion Dollar 
Consumer Auto Loan Bubble is Beginning to Burst, THE ECON. COLLAPSE (Sept. 6, 2016), http://th 
eeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives/the-one-trillion-dollar-consumer-auto-loan-bubble-is-
beginning-to-burst. As early as 2012, the following was observed: 
The subprime auto lending market appears to be very similar to the subprime mortgage 
lending market that existed [before] the financial crisis of 2008. Some of the current 
tactics used by subprime auto lenders include: charging consumers hidden fees, lying 
about interest rates, and inaccurate reporting of facts on borrowers’ loan applications. 
Christopher K. Seide, Consumer Financial Protection Post Dodd-Frank: Solutions to Protect 
Consumers Against Wrongful Foreclosure Practices and Predatory Subprime Auto Lending, 3 U. 
P.R. BUS. L. J. 219, 250 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
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In 2016, the volume of outstanding auto loans reached a new all-time high of 
$1.072 trillion, an increase of more than forty percent from late 2009.17  In that 
time, “subprime auto lending has more than doubled, while lending on terms 
that reflect a good credit history has increased by only about half.” 18  Although 
some see this trend as a signal of vitality in the automotive market, banks are 
capitalizing on this market in precisely the same way they capitalized on the 
housing market.19 This is leading to a sharp influx of lenders in the subprime 
auto loan market, as well as a rise in deceptive and predatory lending practices 
by dealers.20 
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), created by Dodd-
Frank, aims to ensure that “markets for consumer financial products are fair, 
competitive, and transparent,” and has broad regulatory authority over consumer 
financial markets.21  But due to lobbying efforts, Dodd-Frank excluded auto 
dealers from the authority of the CFPB, thereby restricting the CFPB’s ability to 
regulate the auto market.22  Despite a recent promulgation expanding the CFPB’s 
regulatory authority over certain automobile dealers,23 subprime borrowers 
remain targets for many dealers because of the sizable profits that dealers can 
reap from them.24 
Despite extensive regulations intended to protect consumers, consumers face 
costly abuses totaling billions of dollars.25  Abuses like predatory lending, 
inability to discharge auto loan debt in bankruptcy, and abusive debt collection 
practices make it difficult for consumers to satisfy their debt obligations.26  
                                                 
 17. Melinda Zabritski, State of the Automotive Finance Market: A Look at Loans and Leases 
in Q4 2016, EXPERIAN (2016), http://www.experian.com/automotive/automotive-credit-webin 
ar.html; Egan, supra note 15. 
 18. Editorial, Putting an End to Abusive Car Loans, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015) 
http://nyti.ms/1SdurwW [hereinafter Abusive Car Loans]. 
 19. Seide, supra note 16, at 249–51. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1021, 124 Stat. 1376, 1979–80 (2010). 
 22. Daniel Indiviglio, 5 Ways Lobbyists Influenced the Dodd-Frank Bill, THE ATLANTIC (July 
5, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/5-ways-lobbyists-influenced-the-
dodd-frank-bill/59137. 
 23. Defining Larger Participants of the Automobile Financing Market and Defining Certain 
Automobile Leasing Activity as a Financial Product or Service, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 30, 
2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1090) [hereinafter “Defining Larger Participants”]. 
 24. CARTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 447 (“[G]enerally one half or more of dealer’s profits 
come not from the sale of cars, but from the sale of financing and related products.”); Heath, supra 
note 7. 
 25. Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18. 
 26. For a discussion of issues relating to bankruptcy, see Chunlin Leonhard, Negative 
Externalities and Subprime Auto Financing: Time to Let the Hanging Paragraph Go, 45 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 267 (2014) (describing how a bankruptcy provision that prevents debtors from discharging 
auto loan debt by bankruptcy hinders their ability to productively participate in the economy) and 
Miyong Mary Kang, Comment, Is It Time to Hang the Hanging Paragraph, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(A)?, 
26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 49 (2009) (arguing that, under the title bankruptcy provision, debtors 
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Although some see the CFPB’s expansion of regulatory authority over auto 
dealers as a step toward curtailing these issues, others view this as the CFPB 
overstepping its authority, thereby harming the very consumers they seek to 
help.27 
This Comment argues that the auto dealer exemption in Dodd-Frank should 
remain in place and further regulation of the subprime auto loan market is 
unnecessary because the factors that contributed to the collapse of the mortgage 
market are absent in today’s auto loan market.  In addition, the current 
regulations are sufficient to protect consumers from abusive, predatory, and 
deceptive practices.  Part I of this Comment discusses the market conditions that 
led up to the enactment of Dodd-Frank and how the CFPB regulates the 
automotive finance market. Part II discusses the various consumer protection 
issues prevalent in the industry today.  Finally, Part III recommends keeping the 
current regulatory system in place and discusses the potential costs of increased 
regulation. 
I.  EVENTS THAT FORMED THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
A.  The Economic Crisis of 2008 
In the years leading up to the economic crisis of 2008, deregulation of the 
market, predatory lending practices, and the securitization of subprime loans set 
in motion a chain of events that would cripple the U.S. economy.  In the 
aftermath, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in an effort to prevent another crisis. 
1.  Growth of the Housing Bubble 
The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by the bursting of the 
tech bubble, a decline in consumer spending, rising energy prices, and rising 
unemployment.28  In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act29 to quell 
public outrage regarding stock market losses and countless instances of 
corporate fraud.30  Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought accountability to 
corporate officers engaging in securities fraud, it did little to hinder the growth 
of a housing bubble that would play an important role in the 2008 economic 
                                                 
should be able to fully repay their debts by surrendering their cars so that debtors are not left having 
to pay the difference between the remaining debt and the depreciated value of the car when, in all 
likelihood, they would be unable to do so). 
 27. See Richard J. Zack et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Takes the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act for a Spin in the Indirect Auto Lending Industry and Crashes into Dealer 
Markup Policies, 45 UCC L.J.  4 (2014) (on file with Catholic University Law Review). 
 28. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1779 (2011). 
 29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 30. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 1779–80. 
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crisis.31  As a result of low interest rates, “the deregulatory strategy of allowing 
nonbank financial intermediaries to provide services virtually indistinguishable 
from those of banks,” increasing rates of unemployment, and irresponsible 
behavior by both subprime borrowers and lenders, a bubble in the housing 
market developed where housing prices rose and peaked in early 2006.32 
Subprime borrowers are often targets for predatory loans designed to exploit 
unsophisticated, vulnerable borrowers.33  As the result of deregulation in 
financial markets and low interest rates, lenders were extending credit to 
subprime borrowers who were unlikely to repay their debts.34  Although 
subprime loans by their nature carry with them a higher risk of default, lenders 
were able to lessen this risk through securitization.35  Securitization improves 
market liquidity and incentivizes lenders to extend credit regardless of a 
consumers’ ability to repay.36 
In November 2007, the Center for Responsible Lending reported that 7.2 
million families held a subprime mortgage, 14.44% of subprime mortgages were 
in default, and $1.3 trillion worth of subprime loans were outstanding.37  When 
housing prices began falling in late 2007, panic swept over the financial market, 
and large banks struggled to find funding.38  As consumer default rates rose and 
home values declined, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in an effort to curb 
the rapid decline in the stock market.39 
By 2008, financial institutions were suffering massive losses, and the U.S. 
government began stepping in to “bail out” commercial and investment banks.40  
As housing prices continued to fall, unemployment rates rose, commercial 
institutions once considered “too big to fail” were on the brink of collapse, and 
stock prices fell to all-time lows, the United States fell into one of the worst 
                                                 
 31. See Congressional Comments About Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 252, 252 
(2003). 
 32. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION 22–23 (2009); accord ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 62 (3d 
ed. 2015). 
 33. Sally Pitman, Comment, Arms, But No Legs To Stand On: “Subprime”  Solutions Plague 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2008). For common 
characteristics of subprime borrowers, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 34. See Seide, supra note 16, at 224. 
 35. See Pitman, supra note 33, at 1102; see also Leonhard, supra note 26, at 286.  
Securitization is the process where “interests in loans and other receivables are packaged, 
underwritten, and sold in the form of ‘asset-backed’ securities.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF 
THE CURRENCY, L-SEC, ASSET SECURITIZATION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 2 (1997), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/asset-securi 
tization/pub-ch-asset-securitization.pdf. 
 36. Pitman, supra note 33, at 1098. 
 37. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1 (2007), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf. 
 38. Seide, supra note 16, at 225. 
 39. Pitman, supra note 33, at 1103. 
 40. Seide, supra note 16, at 229–30. 
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recessions since the Great Depression.41  In the aftermath, many government and 
industry officials have agreed that subprime lending was one of the major causes 
of the 2008 financial crisis.42 
2.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
In response to the financial crisis, President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into 
law on July 21, 2010.43  The purpose of Dodd-Frank is “to promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, 
and for other purposes.” 44  Dodd-Frank has many key provisions, including: 
(1) consumer protections; (2) systemic risk oversight; (3) executive 
compensation regulation; (4) bank capital requirements; (5) ending 
“too big to fail”  bailouts; (6) transparency and accountability relating 
to complex financial instruments; (7) enforcement of current 
regulations; (8) reform of the Federal Reserve; (9) mortgage lending 
reform; (10) hedge fund oversight; (11) control over credit rating 
agencies; (12) reform of insurance regulations and investor 
protections; and (13) addressing securitization and municipal 
securities.45 
3.  The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the Consumer Financial Protection 
Act of 2010 (CFPA), which established the CFPB.46  The CFPB was created “to 
implement and enforce federal consumer financial laws in order to promote 
fairness, transparency, and competition in markets for consumer financial 
products and services.” 47  The CFPB is an independent agency with rulemaking 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 230–32; accord Pitman, supra note 33, at 1105. 
 42. See KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF 
THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 3 (2008) (“Many experts and economists believe [the crisis] came 
about th[r]ough [sic] the combination of a number of factors in which subprime lending played a 
major part.”); see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 18–23 (2011) (finding that widespread failures in regulation and supervision, a 
failure of corporate governance and risk management, and a systemic breakdown in accountability 
and ethics in the markets were the key factors in causing the crisis).  But see Matthews, supra note 
13. 
 43. Seide, supra note 16, at 235. 
 44. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
 45. Seide, supra note 16, at 235–36 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010)). 
 46. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); Karoline E. Andris & Kenneth J. Rojc, Automotive Finance: 
Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 597, 597 (2012). 
 47. Kim B. Perez, Note, The CFPB “Indirectly” Regulates Lending Through Auto Dealers, 
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 399, 401 (2014); see 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). 
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authority and power to enforce consumer laws such as the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).48  Before 
Congress consolidated consumer financial protection “rulemaking, supervisory, 
and enforcement authority” under the CFPB, this power was shared by seven 
different federal agencies.49 
In addition to the CFPB, several other federal agencies “oversee the activities, 
products, and services that auto finance companies offer.”50  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), which has authority over “deceptive trade practices and 
debt collection activities,”51 gathers information on possible consumer 
protection issues and “brings enforcement actions against auto credit providers 
for deceptive practices.” 52  The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for 
enforcing fair lending laws.53  Finally, states also retain enforcement powers 
over the provisions in the CFPA.54 
Section 1029 of Dodd-Frank excludes auto dealers from the CFPB’s 
authority.55  The inclusion of this provision has been attributed to lobbyists such 
as former Senator Sam Brownback who asserted that auto dealers were not 
responsible for the financial crisis and therefore should not be federally 
regulated by the CFPB.56  As a result, the CFPB is prohibited from exercising 
any rulemaking, supervisory, or enforcement authority over “a motor vehicle 
dealer that is predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles, 
the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both.” 57  However, Dodd-Frank 
                                                 
 48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002(12), 1002(14), 1022(a); 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12), 5491(a). 
 49. US Consumer Regulatory Law: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW FINANCE, WL Practice Note 
0-541-5546 (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Regulatory Law: Overview]. This included the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (national banks), Federal Reserve Board (state-chartered 
member banks), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (state-chartered non-member banks and 
other state-chartered banking institutions), National Credit Union Administration (federally-
insured credit unions), Office of Thrift Supervision (federal savings and loan associations and 
thrifts), the FTC (consumer protection generally), and HUD (housing).  Id. 
 50. Kevin M. McDonald & Kenneth J. Rojc, Automotive Finance: Shifting into Regulatory 
Overdrive, 69 BUS. LAW. 599, 599 (2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Kwesi D. Atta-Krah, Note, Preventing a Boom from Turning Bust: Regulators Should 
Turn Their Attention to Starter Interrupt Devices Before the Subprime Auto Lending Bubble Bursts, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1201 (2016). 
 53. McDonald & Rojc, supra note 50, at 599. 
 54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, § 1042; see Regulatory Law: Overview, supra note 49; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(3) 
(2012) (discussing coverage of the Larger Participant Rule and the requirement that the CFPB 
consult with the FTC before issuing a new rule). 
 55. 12 U.S.C. § 5519. 
 56. See Indiviglio, supra note 22; Janet Hook & Jim Puzzanghera, Battle over Financial Form 
Pits Auto Dealers vs. Military, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2010) http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/ 
13/business/la-fi-car-dealers-20100514. 
 57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1029; see Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PL 111-203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat 1376, Title 
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does not exclude: (a) dealers who “provide consumers with any services related 
to residential or commercial mortgages or self-financing transactions involving 
real property”; (b) dealers “who extend credit or leases involving motor vehicles 
directly to consumers and does not routinely assign the governing contract to an 
unaffiliated third party”; or (c) dealers who “offer[] a consumer financial product 
or service unrelated to a motor vehicle.”58 
Although the CFPB is largely precluded from regulating motor vehicle 
dealers, the Federal Reserve Board and the FTC are still able to do so.59  
According to Congress, the CFPA provides the FTC with authority to “prescribe 
unfair or deceptive trade practice rules against automobile dealers in accordance 
with the standard informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act rather than having to adhere to the much more rigorous 
procedures of the Magnuson-Moss Act, [which the FTC must normally 
follow].”60  Indeed, Congress believed that the CFPA “ma[de] it somewhat 
easier for the FTC to regulate [auto dealers].” 61  Although the FTC has broad 
power to prohibit any practice that it determines to be unfair or deceptive by 
motor vehicle dealers, even if the practice or act is related to vehicle financing, 
the FTC has not exercised this power as of 2015.62 
The CFPB has the authority to “prevent a covered person or service provider 
from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice 
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a 
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial 
product or service.” 63  A covered person is “any person that engages in offering 
or providing a consumer financial product or service.” 64  The CFPB also has 
regulatory authority over any covered person who “is a larger participant of a 
market for other consumer financial products or services,” and is authorized by 
Dodd-Frank to define “larger participants” of certain financial markets.65  In 
addition, the CFPB has authority over those who “the Bureau has reasonable 
cause to determine . . . is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks 
                                                 
X § 1029; CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, 
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 499–500 (Andrew A. Turner et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CCH]. 
 58. SUSAN BERSON & DAVE BERSON, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: FROM LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENTATION TO LITIGATION 59–60 
(2012); accord 12 U.S.C. § 5519(b). 
 59. See ABA, REVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 222–23 (2011); 
CCH, supra note 57, at 500; D. Patrick Yoest et al., Adjusting to the CFPB’s Auto Finance 
Examination Authority, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 224, 226 (2015). 
 60. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41338, THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE X, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU 10 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Yoest et. al, supra note 59, at 226. 
 63. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
 64. § 1002(6)(A). 
 65. § 5514(a)(1)(B). 
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to consumers with regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial 
products or services.”66 
Although the CFPB has broad power, it cannot declare something “unfair” 
unless there exists a reasonable basis to conclude that “the act or practice causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”67  Although this 
requirement is effective to curtail some of the CFPB’s power, a unique feature 
of Dodd-Frank is the creation of the “abusive” standard, which provides the 
CFPB with expansive authority to regulate the market.68  Under this standard, 
the CFPB can declare an act abusive only if it: 
[m]aterially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a 
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or takes 
unreasonable advantage of a lack of understanding on the part of the 
consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product of 
service; the inability of the consumer to protect the interest of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or 
service; or the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer.69 
B.  Automobile Industry During and After the 2008 Crisis 
In the aftermath of the financial collapse, the automobile industry recovered 
quickly.70  In 2015, auto loans topped $1 trillion for the first time—an increase 
of more than forty percent from 2009.71  Even compared to prime auto lending, 
subprime auto lending has been booming in recent years, growing at a rate in 
excess of 130% since the financial crisis.72  Between 2009 and 2014, the 
percentages of used car loans that franchise auto makers made to subprime 
borrowers increased from 17% to 25.4%.73  This increase in used car loans is 
interesting in light of Department of Transportation statistics showing that the 
                                                 
 66. § 5514(a)(1)(C). 
 67. § 5531(c). 
 68. Seide, supra note 16, at 241–42. 
 69. § 5531(d). 
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percentage of people using an automobile as a primary means of transportation 
to work has remained relatively constant since 1999.74 
For many, a vehicle is invaluable and may be the only way for consumers “to 
travel to work and earn a paycheck.”75  Despite a general lack of public 
discussion regarding the issue, legislators have been concerned about the state 
of the auto industry since 2009.76  The House Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection found evidence suggesting that “fraudulent 
practices with regard to both the condition and financing of used cars are on the 
rise.” 77  In particular, Representative John Sarbanes found that “in the purchase 
and sale of automobiles . . . [t]here is a legion of opportunities to take advantage 
of people and exploit people.” 78 
Much of this concern revolves around how consumers finance automobile 
purchases.  Consumers can obtain an auto loan through either direct or indirect 
financing.79  Through direct financing, the consumer seeks credit directly from 
a lender, such as a bank or credit union.80  When a consumer obtains indirect 
financing, an auto dealer collects credit information about the applicant and 
facilitates a loan from a third party.81  The indirect lender will then offer the 
dealer a minimum interest rate on the loan, called the “buy rate.” 82  The dealer 
then offers a slightly higher rate to the consumer, either splitting the difference 
between this rate and the buy rate with the lender or retaining any interest over 
the buy rate as compensation.83  Although this “one-stop shop[]”  can be 
beneficial to consumers, dealers and creditors often “work together to needlessly 
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saddle customers with high-interest-rate loans”  that charge astronomical fees.84  
Dealers often seek to increase their profits by including unnecessary add-ons, 
which increase the purchase price of the vehicle and consequently, the amount 
of principle on which the consumer pays interest.85 
In early 2016, the number of car borrowers at least sixty days late on their 
payments had risen to 5.16%, higher than during the financial crisis.86  Further, 
Experian, one of the three major credit reporting agencies, reported that in 2016, 
“[i]ncreases in both [thirty and sixty]-day delinquency rates [rose] as the 
percentage of loans in the subprime portion of open portfolios [grew].” 87  One 
would expect that high delinquency rates, particularly in the subprime area, 
would deter lenders from extending credit to borrowers; however, investors are 
often attracted to the debt because “the riskier the borrower, the higher the 
yield.” 88  This behavior has contributed to a large influx of new issuers entering 
the subprime auto asset-backed securities market.89 
Banks, hedge funds, and private equity groups have been successfully 
marketing these bonds to traditionally conservative investors because these 
securitized investments offer high rates of return and repossessing vehicles are 
relatively easier than foreclosing homes.90  According to JPMorgan Chase, the 
recent rise in delinquencies “can be traced back to new issuers crowding into the 
booming industry.”91  As new lenders scramble to enter the auto lending market, 
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there is concern that these lenders will “lower their underwriting standards as 
they fight for market share in an effort to produce relatively quick returns.” 92  
Delinquency rates on subprime loans issued by new lenders are often higher as 
compared to more established players.93  Thus, there is concern that the subprime 
auto loan market is on the verge of collapse.94 
C.  Recent Trends in the Automotive Finance Industry and Consumer 
Protection 
The state of the automotive finance market has caused mounting concerns 
about another bubble budding in the subprime auto loan market.95  In spite of 
regulatory efforts, lenders in the automotive lending industry are engaging in 
practices disallowed in mortgage lending.96  In addition, some lenders are 
engaging in predatory lending, which has been linked to higher default and 
repossession rates among subprime borrowers.97  In thirty-seven states and 
Washington, D.C., more than half of consumers are forced to take subprime 
loans because their credit scores are too low.98  This statistic could have major 
implications as the majority of predatory lending practices target consumers with 
low credit ratings.99 
Subprime auto finance has been linked to allegations of “reverse redlining . . 
. abusive title loans and repossession practices, loan values that exceed the 
values of the vehicle, and hidden defects in used cars marketed to subprime 
borrowers.” 100  In addition, subprime lenders have been sharply criticized for 
charging hidden fees, inaccurate reporting on loan applications, lying about 
interest rates, use of indirect lending methods, and abusive debt collection 
methods.101  The Center for Responsible Lending speculates that dealer markups 
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on loans could cost consumers “an additional $25.8 billion over the lives of their 
loans.”102 
1.  Predatory Lending 
Predatory loans are characterized by a set of practices and terms including: 
“(1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to 
borrowers, (2) harmful rent seeking, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive 
practices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable 
as fraud, and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal 
redress.”103  In most cases, predatory loans are also subprime loans; however, 
prime-interest loans may “display one or more of the problems that are common 
to predatory loans.” 104 
In 2015, the New York Independent Democratic Caucus published a report 
focused on eight allegedly deceptive lending practices that are unregulated in 
the subprime market.105  These included “auto credit with ‘abusively high 
interest rates’ . . . ; high loan-to-value ratios due to negative equity and ancillary 
product financing; dealer financing markups . . . ; dealer fraud in forcing buyers 
to purchase ‘optional’ ancillary products . . . ; spot delivery; and the use of . . . 
starter interrupt devices.” 106  Although the subprime auto lending market has 
only recently come under scrutiny, the FTC has been investigating allegations 
of illegal lending practices for more than a decade.107 
The prevalence of deceptive and abusive practices in the automotive industry 
is unsurprising due to the large profits that can be made through auto loans.108  
These loans often “contain hidden charges and other essentially useless add-ons 
like credit insurance.”109  Dealers reap the benefits of these markups by “acting 
as a middleman” between the consumer and the lender when the consumer opts 
for “dealer financing.” 110  The lender gives the dealer discretion to quote a 
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higher interest rate and shares the surplus with the dealer.111  The possibility of 
sharing in that surplus incentivizes the dealer to “sell” the consumer on 
unnecessary add-ons that increase the price and consequently increases the 
amount that can be quoted to the buyer.112  While exercising their discretion, 
lenders have quoted minorities disproportionately higher interest rates than 
white borrowers.113 
Predatory loans have also been linked to “higher odds of default and 
repossession for subprime borrowers,” and puts low-income consumers at higher 
risk of auto-loan predation.114  Before the Federal Reserve outlawed the practice, 
lenders were engaging in similar behavior in the mortgage market.115  In fact, 
“[a]uto lending is the only major lending where dealer markup kickbacks 
through indirect lending still occurs.”116  The CFPB supervises large banks 
making auto loans—i.e., direct financing—but until recently, did not supervise 
nonbank finance companies.117  Thus, there was potential for abuse, deception, 
and predatory lending practices by nonbank finance companies. 
Lenders have not been solely responsible for the issues fueling the recent 
upswing in deceptive practices.118  The CFPB recently held a focus group to 
research consumer experiences with auto financing.119  The results of the focus 
group showed that most consumers: (1) did not conduct advance research on 
available financing options, “[(2)] focused on the monthly payment and vehicle 
price, [(3)] did not consider or attempt to negotiate financing or interest rates, 
and [(4)] purchased add-on products despite having negative perceptions of the 
sales process for add-ons.”120  Overall, the CFPB found among consumers “a 
lack of understanding of financing options, difficulty understanding loan 
features during loan negotiations, and problems with add-ons such as paying for 
unwanted add-ons and reports of lenders insisting that the purchase of add-ons 
was necessary for loan approval.”121 
Despite concerns of deceptive lending practices and lack of education on the 
part of consumers with respect to financing, the CFPB, FTC, and DOJ have 
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brought only a handful of actions against lenders in recent years.122  These 
enforcement actions, however, have proven to have far-reaching impacts.123  
When the CFPB investigated Ally Financial Inc. and Ally Bank (Ally) and found 
that “more than 235,000 African American [sic], Hispanic, Asian and Pacific 
Islander borrowers paid higher interest rates for their auto loans between April 
2011 and December 2013,” the CFPB forced Ally to establish a $80 million 
settlement fund for certain minority borrowers, hire a settlement administrator 
to distribute the funds to the victims, set up a compliance program to avoid 
similar future violations, and fined Ally for $18 million.124  Thus, it is clear that 
regulators possess the tools to identify and remedy deceptive lending practices. 
2.  Efforts by the CFPB to Address Consumer Financial Protection Issues 
“Auto loans are the third largest category of household debt,” eclipsed “only 
by mortgage and student loan debt.”125  According to CFPB Director Richard 
Cordray, “[n]onbank auto finance companies extend hundreds of billions of 
dollars in credit to American consumers, yet they have never been supervised at 
the federal level.”126  On June 10, 2015, the CFPB exercised its rulemaking 
authority under Dodd-Frank to define “larger participants.”127  Under the new 
rule, a “nonbank covered person that engages in automobile financing is a larger 
participant of the automobile financing market if it has at least 10,000 aggregate 
annual originations.”128 
When the CFPB proposed this rule, roughly thirty-eight entities met this 
requirement, accounting for approximately ninety percent of the auto loan 
market.129  The regulation was directed toward protecting consumers who seek 
indirect financing through auto finance companies, specialty finance companies, 
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captive nonbanks, and Buy Here Pay Here (BHPH) companies.130  Of these, 
large “captive” nonbanks, which are subsidiary finance companies owned by 
auto manufacturers, dominate the market, with specialty finance companies and 
BHPH companies accounting for a significant portion of the remaining market 
share.131  However, the new definition does not cover motor vehicle dealers, as 
they are explicitly excluded from Dodd-Frank.132 
Through the new rule, the CFPB seeks to ensure that auto lenders are “treating 
consumers fairly by: [f]airly marketing and disclosing auto financing, . . . 
[p]roviding accurate information to credit bureaus”; and “[t]reating consumers 
fairly when collecting debts.”133  In particular, the new rule sought to address 
“discriminatory pricing in the auto-lending market.”134  The CFPB found that 
indirect auto financing presents a risk of discrimination because of “the 
incentives these policies create, and the discretion they permit.”135  In addition, 
the new rules have brought automobile leasing and BHPH companies under the 
supervision of the CFPB.136  According to the CFPB, automobile leasing 
amounts to the “functional equivalent” of purchase finance agreements because, 
as in such agreements, consumers must provide largely the same information as 
when seeking a loan and typically have the option to purchase the vehicle after 
the lease period.137  The importance of automobiles to financial well-being and 
auto finance’s position as the third largest category of household debt are 
repeatedly cited as an important reason for increased regulation in this market.138 
Proponents of the new rule view this as a step in the right direction toward 
protecting consumers against unfair, deceptive, and predatory practices, thereby 
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limiting the risk of another loan bubble.139  In fact, proponents claim that 
additional regulations are necessary to fully protect consumers.140  Director 
Cordray defends the Bureau’s actions on grounds that “nonbank finance 
companies originate ‘about’ forty percent of auto loans made today and more 
than eighty-five percent of auto leases.”141  He claims that the CFPB “permits 
honest competition to flourish,” and the CFPB “provides valuable information 
to Congress as its seeks to monitor the markets and prevent another financial 
crisis.” 142  Moreover, the CFPB claims that the new Larger Participant Rule 
“does not impose new substantive consumer protection requirements” because 
“[n]onbank covered persons generally are subject to the Bureau’s regulatory and 
enforcement authority, and any applicable Federal consumer financial law, 
regardless of whether they are subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority.” 143 
Although market participants are concerned about additional compliance 
costs imposed by the new rule, the CFPB expects the cost of compliance to be 
minimal.144  The CFPB estimates that the total cost of an examination would 
cost “less than one-tenth of [one] percent of total revenue from originations for 
that year.”145  Further, the CFPB expects compliance costs to be “limited” for 
both existing and newly covered entities, arguing that although FTC Act does 
not impose the “abusive” standard, most practices covered by the new rule are 
already covered by other sections of Dodd-Frank and the FTC Act.146  
Furthermore, the CFPB believes that for those entities already subject to 
supervision, additional costs will be “minimal.”147 
On the other hand, many critics are concerned that the CFPB “overextends its 
mandate, limits consumer choice[,] and negatively [affects] the economy.”148  
The National Automobile Dealers Association and the National Association of 
Minority Auto Dealers have expressed concern that this new rule will “increase 
the cost of auto financing by impairing competition in the auto-lending 
market.”149  In addition, critics argue that the new rule ignores that dealer 
markups include “negotiation over purchase price and interest rate, and 
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compensation from markups can be used to offset lower purchase prices.”150  
Moreover, critics argue that the costs of developing a comprehensive system to 
ensure compliance with the CFPB,151  the $750,000 to $1 million that larger 
companies would have to pay in preparation for the CFPB’s examinations, and 
the costs of defending against a CFPB action will be passed on to consumers.152  
Finally, critics argue that the CFPB is attempting to circumvent the auto dealer 
exemption in Dodd-Frank to regulate dealers outside its jurisdiction.153 
3.  The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Consumer Protection 
The FTC also plays a role in the auto lending market by protecting consumers 
from unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent trade practices.154  The FTC is permitted 
under Dodd-Frank to prescribe rules regarding auto dealers.155  Specifically, the 
FTC can regulate auto dealers who engage in “unfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”156  The FTC also has authority to prescribe “rules which define with 
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting consumers.”157 
The FTC has brought several actions against auto dealers through its 
powers.158  Specifically, the FTC brought deceptive advertising actions.159  In 
addition, the FTC collaborated with law enforcement officials to “target auto 
finance application fraud, deceptive practices related to add-on products and 
services, and deceptive advertising.”160 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH CFPB OVERSIGHT OF AUTO DEALERS 
The exclusion of automobile dealers from Dodd-Frank has introduced a 
myriad of issues into the subprime auto financing market.  Underlying these 
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issues is the tension between consumer protection and freedom of contract.161  
On one side, subprime auto lending has an established history of harming low-
income consumers and minorities.162  Given their decreased credit scores, such 
individuals are prime targets for predatory lending practices that exasperate their 
credit issues.163  Furthermore, access to personal transportation is often essential 
to employment, given that ninety-one percent of Americans “commute to work 
using their personal vehicles.”164  As such, individuals with subprime credit are 
forced to take out loans that far exceed the value of the vehicle.165 
On the other hand, consumers voluntarily enter into these financing contracts, 
and proponents of deregulation argue that lenders should not be penalized for 
extending credit to individuals whose poor credit scores ordinarily bar them 
from financing.166  Having extended credit to risky borrowers, lenders need 
some way to collect on defaulted loans.167  Without the monetary incentives, 
lenders likely would be reluctant to make subprime loans, in turn depriving the 
subprime borrowers of the financing to purchase vehicles they need to hold 
employment.168 
A.  The CFPB’s Power to Protect Consumers 
The CFPB possesses broad powers to regulate financial markets.  Before the 
implementation of the new Larger Participant rule, the CFPB had authority to 
regulate large banks that directly financed automobile purchases by 
                                                 
 161. See Abusive Car Loans, supra note 18 (“Of course, dealer-arranged financing is not 
always a bad deal, and dealers should be fairly compensated for their services. But for many 
consumers, especially for those without other financing options, dealer-arranged financing can lead 
to unfair and deceptive lending, which is illegal under federal consumer financial law.”). 
 162. See id. 
 163. Sweeting, supra note 140, at 832. 
 164. See Kirk, supra note 90, at 73 (“While subprime mortgages and subprime vehicle loans 
differ substantially, one difference in particular is simple but key: a consumer can forego purchasing 
a home and rent one, but car ownership is a requisite for an overwhelming majority of American 
households.”). 
 165. See Leonhard, supra note 26, at 281–82 (“The BHPH dealers target people who need cars 
to get to work, but can’t qualify for conventional loans because of poor credit scores. Because the 
buyers can’t obtain loans elsewhere, they have to pay interest at three times the going 
rate or greater for regular used car loans.”). 
 166. See Austin Goolsbee, ‘Irresponsible’ Mortgages Have Opened Doors to Many of the 
Excluded, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/business/29scen 
e.html (“[T]he historical evidence suggests that cracking down on new mortgages may hit exactly 
the wrong people. As Professor [Harvey S. Rosen of Princeton University] explains, ‘The main 
thing that innovations in the mortgage market have done over the past 30 years is to let in the 
excluded: the young, the discriminated against, the people without a lot of money in the bank to 
use for a down payment.’ It has allowed them access to mortgages whereas lenders would have 
once just turned them.”). 
 167. See Sweeting, supra note 140, at 826. 
 168. Kirk, supra note 90, at 73. 
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consumers.169  After the new rule became effective, the CFPB had authority over 
roughly ninety percent of the auto finance market.170 Although Dodd-Frank 
explicitly excluded auto dealers from the authority of the CFPB, the CFPB 
nonetheless oversees a vast majority of this market.171 
Director Cordray argues that this regulation is necessary to protect consumers 
who need automobiles for financial stability.172  However, this argument is a 
rather weak justification for such broad regulatory action, particularly in the face 
of a statute explicitly excluding auto dealers from the CFPB’s authority.  Rather, 
the regulation seems like a thinly veiled attempt by the CFPB to regulate one of 
the only credit markets that remain outside its supervision. 
Now that the Larger Participant rule is in place, a majority of previously 
uncovered persons will be required to comply with the rules and regulations of 
the CFPB.  The $750,000 and $1 million per examination estimated by the rule’s 
critics may very well be passed on to consumers.173  Although the cost of 
compliance will likely decrease over time as the entities become more familiar 
with the applicable regulations, this cost is unnecessary altogether because the 
FTC already largely oversees this market. 
Consequently, additional oversight by the CFPB would only further 
complicate matters by duplicating powers between two agencies.  The FTC is 
charged with oversight for these types of transactions under largely the same 
standard and has exercised its authority on numerous occasions.174  Moreover, 
the “abusive” standard imposed by Dodd-Frank is a higher bar for entities to 
comply with.175  Auto dealers were expressly excluded from the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction and thus this higher standard.  By circumventing this express act by 
Congress, the CFPB has only added unnecessary costs through duplicative 
oversight. 
B.  Likelihood of an Auto Loan Bubble 
There has been growing concern about a bubble forming in the subprime auto 
loan market, similar to the one in the mortgage market that contributed to the 
                                                 
 169. Compare CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80 (noting that the CFPB’s 
proposed role would include “nonbank auto finance entities” within its purview) with 12 U.S.C. § 
5481(6) (2012) (defining the entities within the CFB’s purview as those “engag[ing] in offering or 
providing a consumer financial product” and affiliates of those entities). 
 170. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80. 
 171. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5519(a) (2012); see also Article 6-582-2226, supra note 129. 
 172. CFPB Proposes Federal Oversight, supra note 80 (“Many people depend on auto 
financing to pay for the car they need to get to work . . . .  Nonbank auto finance companies extend 
hundreds of billions of dollars in credit to American consumers, yet they have never been 
supervised at the federal level . . . .  Today’s proposal would extend our oversight, allowing us to 
root out discrimination and ensure consumers are being treated fairly across this market.”). 
 173. See Defining Larger Participants, supra note 23, at 37,520. 
 174. See Chamness et al., supra note 85, at 727–28. 
 175. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 1783. 
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financial collapse of 2008.176   Although auto lending is the third largest area of 
consumer debt, the fear of another bubble can be attributed to the close temporal 
proximity between increased levels of auto lending and the mortgage crisis.  
Analysts and industry officials are aware of the current lending trends and have 
repeatedly rejected the notion that another bubble is building.177 
There are many factors that make the likelihood of another bubble unlikely.  
First, the size of the auto loan market is, at most, less than an eighth of the size 
of the housing market.178  Second, banks and other lenders are more heavily 
regulated through Dodd-Frank and thus less likely to undertake the risks that 
contributed to the mortgage crisis.  Furthermore, recovering collateral is far 
easier in auto lending than in mortgage lending.  When a borrower defaults on 
payments, lenders can recover a portion of their losses in a matter of days, 
whereas in mortgage lending, lenders must wait months or years for the debtor’s 
home to be foreclosed before they can recover.179  The increased certainty of a 
quick recovery allows lenders to more accurately adjust their lending practices 
going forward.180  Finally, after Dodd-Frank and the CFPB’s new Larger 
Participant rule, there are few auto lenders that remain unregulated. 
Although the delinquency rate of loans, particularly in the subprime area, still 
concerns many,181 the delinquency rate is not necessarily the best indicator of 
market vitality.182  A large portion of these delinquency rates have been 
attributed to new lenders in the market.183  As these lenders become more 
established and improve their risk analytics, it is likely that the delinquency rates 
stabilize.  Moreover, delinquencies account for only a tiny fraction of the overall 
market.184  This, combined with the relative ease of repossession of collateral 
and the substantially lower cost of an automobile as compared to a house, shows 
that delinquency rates are not necessarily indicative of imminent financial 
collapse. 
                                                 
 176. See Smith, supra note 16 (“History has shown that aggressive subprime lending is 
unfavorable to both subprime borrowers, investors and subprime lenders. Most recently, subprime 
lending led to the rise and collapse of the housing bubble, in turn, this led to the U.S. subprime 
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and June 2009. Now, there is one industry that is reminiscent of the U.S. subprime mortgage lending 
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Auto loans overall make up a much smaller universe of lending compared to mortgages. And banks 
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 180. See id. 
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III.  ADDITIONAL REGULATION IS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD HARM 
CONSUMERS 
For good reason, many industry members, analysts, and academics feel that 
the CFPB has substantially more power than needed to achieve its goals.  
Although the CFPB has complied with its mandate to protect consumers in 
financial markets, it has overstepped its authority in the auto lending market.  
Dodd-Frank specifically excludes auto dealers from the authority of the CFPB.  
It is reasonable to read the auto dealer exclusion as encompassing nonbank auto 
finance companies generally, as evidenced by Senator Brownback’s rationale 
for the section asserting that auto dealers were not responsible for the financial 
crisis.185 
The circumstances and the actions taken by regulators, banks, and mortgage 
lenders before and leading up to the financial crisis are notably absent in the 
current subprime auto lending market.  In particular, while the deregulation of 
the mortgage lending market was a significant contributor to the growth of the 
housing bubble,186 the auto loan market is heavily regulated, with more than 
ninety percent of lending entities currently regulated.187  Moreover, while 
consumers view the purchase of real estate as an investment that has the potential 
to increase in value,188 most consumers are aware that there is almost no 
possibility of a vehicle rising in value and that most vehicles depreciate in value 
as soon as the vehicle is driven off the lot.189  Thus, there is no comparable risk 
in the auto lending market that a period of falling asset values will surprise vast 
numbers of consumers. 
The crux of the complaints regarding the auto lending market relate to unfair, 
deceptive, and predatory practices.  However, there is no need for the CFPB to 
bring actions on these grounds as the FTC already oversees this area.  
Authorizing the CFPB to bring actions on these grounds would only further 
increase compliance costs by lenders, costs that would be passed on to 
consumers through increased prices and higher interest rates.  As Director 
Cordray stated, automobiles are essential to maintaining employment and 
financial stability.  By introducing additional obstacles and increasing the prices 
of automobiles, additional regulations may in fact harm the very consumers that 
regulators seek to protect.  Finally, regulations that further decrease the risk of 
auto loan transactions for lenders by preventing them from making risky loans, 
will disincentive lenders from extending credit to subprime borrowers.  This 
means that consumers will be less able to acquire the financing they need to 
purchase vehicles. 
                                                 
 185. Perez, supra note 47, at 402; see Indiviglio, supra note 22. 
 186. Pitman, supra note 33, at 1093. 
 187. Article 6-582-2226, supra note 129. 
 188. See Kang, supra note 26, at 53; see also Matthews, supra note 13. 
 189. See Kang, supra note 26, at 53. 
2018] The CFPB's Endaround 387 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
After the financial crisis of 2008, consumers and regulators were 
understandably wary about lending practices.  In recent years, subprime auto 
lending has come under scrutiny, with many calling for additional regulation in 
the auto finance market.  The Dodd-Frank auto dealer exemption largely 
prevents the CFPB from regulating the auto finance market.  However, the 
CFPB’s new definition of a “larger participant” leaves few auto lenders outside 
the supervision of the Bureau.  Despite contentions that additional regulations 
are necessary to protect consumers, additional regulations may do more harm 
than good by increasing prices and interest rates, and limiting consumer access 
to credit. 
 
 
 
